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O
ver the past several years, the issuance of small business loan securitizations 
rose steeply with rated transactions completed by Business Loan Express, GE, 
and Lehman, to name a few. Community development lenders also gained 
notoriety beginning in 2004, when Standard & Poor’s rated its first portfolio of 
loans whose underlying loan purpose was to spur community growth and development.
In rating both small business and community development portfolios, we recognized an 
opportunity to provide a tool—our Small Business Portfolio Evaluator™—for both our ratings 
process and our lenders’ internal risk management. For a community development lender 
who is issuing debt in the capital markets, these potential benefits could have favorable credit 
implications.
For example, the Small Business Portfolio Evaluator (the SBP Evaluator) will flag the 
loans it deems as very risky from a capital markets perspective and allow the lender to adjust 
the underwriting accordingly. It will also generate the gross default and net loss percent-
ages of a given pool on an aggregate level, which speaks to the pool’s leverage or the equity 
needed to execute a securitization. Both of these credit feedback components are essential in 
the planning process for lenders issuing debt in the capital markets.
Why We Developed the SBP Evaluator
From a securitization standpoint, analyzing the credit quality of U.S. small businesses 
can be challenging. The small business marketplace is diverse, and individual businesses 
are vulnerable to risks that were unforeseen when the loans were underwritten. We devel-
oped the SBP Evaluator, a Monte Carlo–based algorithm that assesses loan portfolio default 
outcomes under various stress scenarios, to help the issuing and investing communities in 
their analysis.
A mainstay of U.S. economic growth, small businesses have been steadily gaining atten-
tion in the arena of structured finance. Small businesses account for more than half of the 
private-sector output in the United States, and they employ more than half of the country’s 
workers. Through extended demand loans, seasonal lines of credit, and single-purpose loans 
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for machinery, equipment, and other purposes, U.S. banks extend hundreds of billions of 
dollars of loans to small businesses annually. These loans are sometimes securitized through 
capital market issuances backed by cash flows from discrete loan portfolios.
Since 1997, Standard & Poor’s has rated some 50 issuances securitizing small business 
loans, aggregating over $14 billion. This total is a small fraction of the estimated $1-trillion-
plus in outstanding small business loans. With the SBP Evaluator, the structured market 
has an effective tool to expand securitization of such loans. In developing the model, Stan-
dard & Poor’s analyzed the largest available pool of loan performance data and found that, 
after accounting for business sector and geographic correlation, one can generate statistically 
stable simulations of loan portfolio default outcomes.
The SBP Evaluator can contribute to analysis and surveillance of small business loan 
securitizations in a number of ways. It can:
•	 Help	banks,	other	small	business	lenders,	and	secondary	market	participants	manage	
risk in the portfolio;
•	 Assess	expected	portfolio	defaults	based	on	obligor	size,	Standard	Industrial	Code	
(SIC) sector distribution, and geographic concentration;
•	 Assist	in	ratings	surveillance	by	assessing	changes	in	portfolio	credit	quality	due	to	
prepayments, defaults, or substitutions;
•	 Analyze	revolving	structures	where	portfolio	composition	changes	regularly;
•	 Above	 all,	 provide	 an	 industry-wide	 assessment	 platform	 and	 greater	 levels	 of	  
transparency.
The SBP Evaluator uses the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) program’s 
historical loan default data to Monte Carlo–simulate the default distribution for a geograph-
ically correlated loan portfolio (see Appendix: The SBA 7(a) Program). Standard & Poor’s 
uses the 7(a) program data because it’s the largest publicly available pool of information and 
reflects considerable loan diversity. The 7(a) program guarantees riskier loans than a typical 
commercial lender would generally provide. The 7(a) program data include information   
on unseasoned businesses, borrower and business financial profiles, and nonconforming 
bank loans.
When properly run, the SBP Evaluator produces simulations that show the probability 
distributions of a given loan portfolio’s default rates through the final maturity of the longest 
loan. These simulations model outcomes ranging from scenarios where no loan defaults 
through those where every loan defaults before maturity. The SBP Evaluator determines 
the gross default level for each rating category, consistent with Standard & Poor’s corporate 
ratings benchmarks. While portfolios will vary in size, a minimum of several hundred obli-
gors is needed to reach the degree of diversity necessary to achieve a portfolio effect.
The SBP Evaluator was designed for portfolio analysis. It was not designed to estimate the 
default probability of individual loans. This distinction is explained in more detail below.Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
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Model Input and Output
The conceptual framework of the model is shown in the diagram.
  Standard & Poor’s
  Corporate  Portfolio
Desired  Rating Default  Default
 Rating  Probability (%)  Rate (%)
AAA  1.80  25.94
AA+  2.23  25.14
AA  3.22  23.60
AA-  3.62  23.14
A+  4.14  22.56
A  4.81  21.96
A-  5.56  21.33
BBB+  6.92  20.37
BBB  8.63  19.35
BBB-  11.99  17.84
BB+  16.49  16.27
BB  20.43  15.14
BB-  23.06  14.49
B+  26.71  13.67
B  30.34  12.96
B-  34.26  12.25
CCC+  40.32  11.25
CCC  46.39  10.32
CCC-  64.26  7.85
Portfolio Information
➣	 Borrower ID



















As shown on the left, the model requires loan files grouped by obligor. Each file specifies 
the obligor’s ID, loan amount, maturity date, four-digit SIC code, and state or territory.
The default rate associated with each SIC code derives from the 7(a) program data. The 
SBP Evaluator’s calculation of SIC-specific default rates accounts for loan seasoning and 
default rate volatility. Standard & Poor’s current practice provides that if the originator’s 
default history deviates significantly from the default history of its SIC peers (as established 
from 7(a) data), the issuer-specific performance data may be used in the SBP simulations. The 
SBP Evaluator also contains Standard & Poor’s assumptions on small business loan correla-
tion derived from the 7(a) data (see Appendix: Geographic Correlation).
On the right of the diagram is the gross default level for each Standard & Poor’s rating 
category and the comparable corporate rating benchmark. When assessing a loan pool with 
a weighted average life of 14 years, for example, a AAA corporate rating has a default prob-
ability of 1.81 percent corresponding to the AAA gross default rate of 25.94 percent for the 
small business loan portfolio. Over the same period, therefore, the model maintains that the 
default probability of the AAA-rated corporate obligation is the same as the loan portfolio 
experiencing a default rate greater than 25.94 percent. Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
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The model also summarizes material portfolio metrics, thus supporting like-kind compar-
isons of portfolios. “Default measure” is derived from an annualized expected default rate. 
“Volatility measure” is derived from the standard deviation of that expected default rate. 
“Correlation measure” is a ratio of this standard deviation with and without the correlation 
coefficient factored in. These measures, together with rating-specific portfolio gross default 
rates, could lead to standardization and transparency in small business loan securitizations.
Another benefit of the SBP Evaluator is its flexibility: It can model changes in portfolio 
gross default that result from changes in portfolio size, geographic concentration, business 
(SIC) concentration, and borrower concentration.
Data Analysis Used to Build the SBP Evaluator
Before developing the SBP Evaluator, Standard & Poor’s identified and quantified the 
predominant characteristics of U.S. small business loan defaults. The data came from the 
Small  Business  Administration’s  7(a)  database,  which  has  parameters  of  10,000  lenders, 
600,000 disbursed loans, and 1,005 SIC codes. The database covers all 50 states, the District 
of Columbia, and six territories, and it contains 20 years of static pool information and mate-
rial borrower and cash flow information. Standard & Poor’s is aware of no other publicly 
available comparable source of such data.
The 7(a) database also includes borrower-specific information such as employee details, 
loan size, guarantee percentage (loans are not fully guaranteed), female/veteran borrower 
status, new or existing business status, and the organizational form of the borrower. Loan 
information includes details on underwriting (“low-doc”), secondary market sale, and loan 
status history.
Analytical Challenge: The Heterogeneous Nature of  
Small Businesses and Small Business Lending
Compared with other asset classes, small business loans are still in the early stages of 
securitization. In part, this is because of the heterogeneous nature of small businesses. As 
observed in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System’s Report to the Congress 
of	the	Availability	of	Credit	to	Small	Businesses	(1997):	“Historically,	lenders	have	had	diffi-
culty determining the creditworthiness of small business loan applicants. . . .Small businesses 
are extremely diverse—they range from small grocery stores to professional practices to small 
manufacturers. This heterogeneity, together with widely varying uses of borrowed funds, has 
impeded the development of general standards for assessing small business loan applications 
and has made evaluating such loans less straightforward and relatively expensive.”Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
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Standard & Poor’s concluded, after analyzing the 7(a) data, that while it is currently inef-
fective to try to predict the default of individual loans, simulations of portfolios of small busi-
ness loans diversified by business type and geographic location produce statistically sound 
results. The cumulative history of the 7(a) data supports this conclusion. As chart 1 shows, 
the small business loan-default rate varies by location, business sector (as represented by the 
first digit of the four-digit SIC number), and year of underwriting. But overall, the average 
default rate is relatively normally distributed. This, along with other evidence, supports the 
applicability of a Monte Carlo simulation and tranching of portfolio gross default rates by 
the resulting portfolio default distribution, since the Monte Carlo simulation assumes that 
the random variable being simulated is normally distributed.
Data Analysis Methodology
Standard & Poor’s analysis involved a binary logistical regression on whether any model 
could determine the default probability for an individual borrower and, if not, which gener-
alized characteristics in the SBA 7(a) data could explain default variances.
Standard & Poor’s concluded that the SBA 7(a) data are insufficient to accurately model 
the default probability of an individual loan. This is because small business failures usually 
occur as a result of some overwhelming exogenous factor. According to a 1995 study prepared 
for the Small Business Administration entitled “Financial Difficulties of Small Businesses 
and Reasons for Their Failure,” researchers found that exogenous conditions such as new Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
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competition, increased business costs, taxes, business calamities, commercial disputes, or 
personnel issues caused small businesses to fail. Standard & Poor’s SBP Evaluator contrasts 
with larger businesses, where the higher level of business diversification and greater financial 
flexibility tend to give borrowers greater ability to weather external challenges.
On the other hand, the second part of the logistical regression offered an explanation for 
the variance in small business defaults. At the portfolio level, generic issues such as business 
type, location, and loan-underwriting practices are material reasons for loan defaults. Stan-
dard & Poor’s SBP Evaluator responds to these factors by analyzing SIC code-based default 
probability and geographic default correlation, among other issues.
Standard  &  Poor’s  also  analyzed  the  correlation  of  historical  U.S.  macroeconomic 
conditions with the magnitude of small business failures in any particular year (see chart 2). 
Using linear multiple regression, Standard & Poor’s found that 86 percent of small business 
defaults (as measured by the cumulative defaults in the first five years for each vintage) can 
be explained by four macroeconomic indicators at a 95 percent confidence level.
Specifically, the analysis found that bank credit expansion or contraction, as approxi-
mated by commercial and industrial loans outstanding, interest rates, producer prices, and 
the energy component of consumer prices, can explain the changes in business failure rates 
from 1987 to1999. This is consistent with research findings noted previously that link small 
business failures to exogenous factors. Although of limited direct use in the rating process, 
this finding adds perspective to small business loan defaults and the volatility of failure rates. 
It also has applications in the surveillance of small business loan securitizations.Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
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How to Get the SBP Evaluator
We are releasing the SBP Evaluator on a subscription basis. For information on how to 
subscribe, you can visit the SBP Evaluator product page on Standard & Poor’s website at 
www.standardandpoors.com.
Standard & Poor’s will work closely with market participants in testing and enhancing the 
model so that it can be used not only to rate securitizations backed by U.S. small business 
loan portfolios but also to enable originators to determine the level of risk inherent in the 
portfolios they hold.
Additional Information on Monte Carlo Simulation 
and Small Business Rating Criteria
The computation algorithm and application of default correlation in the SBP Evaluator 
are identical to those used in the Standard & Poor’s CDO Evaluator™, a model Standard & 
Poor’s uses to evaluate the credit quality of a portfolio of CDO assets. Additional informa-
tion on Standard & Poor’s Monte Carlo simulation and pair-wise default correlation meth-
odologies is available on RatingsDirect at www.ratingsdirect.com. This information is also   
available on Standard & Poor’s website at www.standardandpoors.com. In addition, Standard & Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
Poor’s general approach to rating small business loan securitizations is detailed in two articles, 
“Criteria for Securitization of U.S. Small and Middle-Market Enterprise Loans,” published 
January 30, 2004 and October 25, 2006. Both articles are available on both websites.
Appendix: The SBA 7(a) Program
Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act provides that the Small Business Administration 
“is empowered . . . to make loans for plant acquisition, construction, conversion, or expan-
sion, including the acquisition of land, material, supplies, equipment, and working capital, 
and to make loans to any qualified small business concern, including those owned by quali-
fied Indian tribes, for purposes of this Act. Such financings may be made either directly or in 
cooperation with banks or other financial institutions through agreements to participate on 
an immediate or deferred (guaranteed) basis.”
The program guarantees a portion (as much as 80 percent on loans up to $100,000 and 
75 percent on loans of more than $100,000) of loan repayment to commercial lenders who 
make loans to U.S. small businesses (see chart 3). In doing so, the 7(a) program helps small 
businesses obtain financing when they might not be eligible for business loans through 
normal lending channels. Typically, an eligible business applies to a lender for financing. 
Based on the creditworthiness of the borrower, the lender decides if it will make the loan 
internally or if it will require an SBA guaranty.
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According	to	Gwendolyn	Bounds,	“Enterprise:	Higher	Fees,	Less	Backing	on	Loans—
Small Firms May Need New Funding Sources in Wake of 7(a) Changes,” Wall Street Journal, 
October 5, 2005: “The program’s success can be measured in its growth: In 1954, the first full 
year 7(a) operated, the SBA helped finance 469 loans totaling a mere $27.3 million. This past 
fiscal year, $12.7 billion was lent (guaranteed) to almost 75,000 small businesses.” During 
the first quarter of fiscal-year 2005, which began October 1, 2004, the SBA approved 23,197 
loans for $3.56 billion, compared with 18,822 loans worth $3.12 billion in the same period 
in 2003, and 3,759 loans worth $2.24 billion in the same period in 2004.
Appendix: Geographic Default Correlation
In general, “default correlation” refers to the phenomenon that borrowers sharing certain 
characteristics tend to default, or survive, together. Because most rated corporate entities 
operate nationally (that is, not exclusively locally or regionally), large rated corporate credit 
defaults tend to be correlated by industry. Examples include the sector weaknesses in the 
telecom and airline industries in 2000. In contrast, small businesses tend to operate locally 
or regionally, rather than nationally, so their local or regional location figures strongly in 
default correlations.
The map illustrates the default pattern for loans to three SIC classifications (restaurant, 
grocery store, and gas/convenience store borrowers) originated in 1999. Of interest are the 
high default clusters in the Rust Belt and Gulf State regions and the conversely low default 
cluster on the West Coast, suggesting a pattern of geographic correlation.
  Default Rate
 0.00 - 0.08
 0.09 - 0.12
  0.13 - 0.15
  0.16 - 0.18
  0.19 - 0.23
  0.24 - 0.28Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
The effect of default correlation on portfolio gross default can be profound. As chart 4 
illustrates, for a AAA rating, evidence of default correlation can increase the gross default rate 
substantially, in this particular case from 30 percent to approximately 43 percent.
In the SBP Evaluator, Standard & Poor’s assumes that standard deviation of default is a 
function of borrower default probabilities and geographic correlation. A Standard & Poor’s 
proprietary  model  estimated  both  interstate  and  intrastate  correlation  coefficients  most 
consistent with observed variability: high default correlation reflects a high level of default 
variance, and low default correlation reflects a low level of default variance. 
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